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A consensus that caring for patients with tuberculosis
(TB) posed a risk to health-care workers did not emerge until
the 1950s and 1960s, when studies established that
Mycobacterium tuberculosis infection was transmitted by the
airborne route (1). However, occupational transmission
received little attention until numerous outbreaks of TB and
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDRTB) occurred in U.S.
and European hospitals in the 1980s and 1990s (2).
More than 20 health-care workers became ill with
MDRTB, and at least 10 died (3). Hundreds of health-care
workers may be latently infected with MDRTB and thus
represent a large repository at risk for future reactivation of
disease. Thus, although the MDRTB and drug-sensitive TB
outbreaks in the United States and Europe have largely been
controlled, the consequences of these outbreaks are still being
felt. This article reviews current approaches to TB control in
hospitals and prospects for improved control.
General Considerations
Efficient control of nosocomial TB is compromised by the
same difficulties complicating community control, including
an insensitive, slow method of diagnosing active disease; an
insensitive, nonspecific method of diagnosing latent disease;
and relatively slow-acting, complicated courses of medical
therapy. However, enormous strides in hospital TB control
were made during the late 1980s and 1990s by using common
sense, trial and error, and published guidelines (4-6). Most
U.S. hospitals now have TB control programs adequate to deal
with current TB levels. Should another epidemic occur,
however, these approaches may prove insufficient, as in the
mid-1980s when the AIDS epidemic introduced a new group
at high risk for active TB.
Community versus Hospital
At the height of the TB resurgence in the early 1990s,
many urban U.S. hospitals reported purified protein
derivative (PPD) conversion rates in health-care workers of
3% to 5% (3). A survey of U.S. hospitals conducted by the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) found a
mean conversion rate of 1.6% (7,8). Most recent studies have
demonstrated rates <1% annually. Although some of the
elevated conversion rate of the early 1990s resulted from the
booster phenomenon, much  was due to occupationally
acquired infection.
Because the conversion rate is now <1% for most U.S.
hospitals, infection control teams can investigate each
instance of potential exposure from an infectious source case.
Despite thousands of potential exposures, many infection
control teams are unable to document tuberculin conversions
in exposed staff, suggesting that many PPD conversions are
the result of community, rather than occupational, transmis-
sion. Supporting this perspective are studies associating zip
code or area of residence with PPD conversion, rather than
specific hospital occupation or specific exposure (9,10).
In some hospitals occupation is significantly associated
with risk for PPD conversion. In studies from New York City
(11) and Brazil (A. Kritski, pers. comm.), housekeepers were
at particularly high risk, independent of area of residence.
The hospitals reporting this finding treated high numbers of
patients with TB (>100 per year), increasing risk for
nosocomial transmission. In hospitals caring for relatively
few cases of TB, however, occupational exposure may indeed
be less important than exposure in the home or community.
The Purified Protein Derivative Test
An active surveillance program must rely on the time-
honored tuberculin PPD test, which is difficult to place, read,
and interpret. In addition, the sensitivity and specificity of
the 19th century test are far lower than those of other modern
diagnostic tests. Among criticisms of the proposed
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
standard (10), perhaps the most compelling is the reliance of
a $250 million program on the PPD test.
The Booster Phenomenon
The booster phenomenon confounds the interpretation of
the PPD test, complicating TB control programs (12). The
extent of boosting in healthy populations was demonstrated
in several CDC-led studies of serial skin testing in otherwise
healthy young health-care workers. A surprising number of
conversions were encountered at the third and fourth test,
even in those not exposed to TB, which suggests that boosting
with the third and fourth serial test may be more common
than assumed. The dramatic rise in PPD conversion rates in
hospitals with outbreaks may result as much from nonspecific
boosting as from true nosocomial transmission and
acquisition of M. tuberculosis. By the same logic, subsequent
decreases in PPD conversion rates may result from the
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exhaustion of the booster phenomenon in a population, rather
than true reduction of nosocomial transmission.
The booster phenomenon is now minimized in hospitals
because the efforts of TB control leaders have resulted in
frequent skin testing. As TB case rates continue to decrease,
along with concern about nosocomial transmission, more
unboosted health-care workers will enter the workforce,
setting the stage for pseudo-outbreaks similar to those in the
1980s and 1990s (13). In worker populations with high rates
of BCG vaccination, boosting is more common (3,13,14). The
strongest argument for maintaining the current 6- to 12-
month skin testing programs is the need to continue to
minimize the booster phenomenon, rather than the need for
heightened surveillance to detect TB transmission.
Approach to Control
The 1994 CDC guidelines for TB control in hospitals and
other health-care facilities (4) have become the basis for all
U.S. hospital TB control programs, as well as the proposed
OSHA standard (10). TB was controlled in hospitals by
implementing numerous control measures within a few
months, in addition to improving staff awareness and concern
(5,15). Thus, it is impossible to know which intervention is the
best or most cost-effective for a hospital with limited
resources and a low TB case-rate. That said, the old adage
that the undiagnosed case is the one most likely to transmit
infection remains useful in establishing priorities for TB
control.
The 1994 guidelines divide the implementation strategy
into a hierarchy of three approaches. Administrative
interventions include those to increase the isolation of
persons with suspected cases, development of a hospital-wide
TB control plan, and maintenance of an active tuberculin
skin-test program for health-care workers. Engineering
controls, which focus on how best to handle air, include
negative pressure capability in respiratory isolation rooms,
placement of UV light fixtures, and installation of HEPA filters.
Personal protective equipment (PPE, masks and
respirators) decisions were complicated by the lack of
clinically meaningful information to guide decisions. After
several years of debate, a relatively cheap and comfortable
product, the N-95 particulate respirator, was settled upon and
is recommended in the proposed OSHA standard.
Research Needs
In addition to unanswered questions regarding these
three interventions, the problems of PPD’s insensitivity and
nonspecificity and the long treatment courses necessary for
cure further complicate hospital TB control. Cost-effective
control of TB may depend on improvement in each of these areas.
Whom to Isolate?
Prompt diagnosis of probable TB requires at least one of
three elements: a compatible clinical presentation; sputum
smear revealing acid-fast bacilli (AFB); or a chest X ray
suggesting TB. Each of these three approaches, however, is
relatively insensitive and nonspecific.
One reason that TB control failed so dramatically during
the early AIDS epidemic was the relative nonspecificity of TB
symptoms in this population. Weight loss, low-grade fevers,
and inanition were often the only complaints, even in patients
with active pulmonary disease. In patients with advanced
AIDS, the same symptoms may be seen in cytomegalovirus
disease, lymphoma, or disseminated M. avium-intracellulare.
This experience illustrated the variable clinical appearance of
TB, particularly in populations with abnormal immune
function.
Infection control decisions regarding maintenance of
respiratory isolation have traditionally been based on the
AFB sputum smear, which has approximately 50% sensitivity
for TB diagnosis. Therefore, half of patients with active
pulmonary TB (i.e., smear-negative disease) are removed
from isolation. The relative contagiousness of patients with
smear-negative pulmonary results is unknown, but indirect
evidence suggests they may transmit infection. A classic
study by Grzybowski et al. defined the tuberculin status of an
entire community, stratified according to exposure to persons
with TB (16). Of small children living in a household with an
adult with AFB smear-negative disease, 6% were tuberculin
reactive, compared with 0.7% of unexposed age-matched
controls. In recent report, a longitudinal molecular typing
study (17) indicated up to 17% of cases of TB in San Francisco
derived from a smear-negative source case. Despite these
studies, the three-smear rule-out has served hospitals well
with only rare problems. A practical approach might be for
clinicians to continue isolation only for patients who have
initial AFB-negative sputum smears but compelling clinical
symptoms and chest X rays.
The use of genetic-based tests to diagnose TB may
improve diagnostic sensitivity (18). However, few such tests
are useful in smear-negative cases and so are of little use in
routine infection control practice. They are appropriate,
however, to further classify persons with AFB smear-positive
disease.
The chest radiograph is notoriously insensitive as a TB
screening tool. Up to 10% of persons with pulmonary TB may
have an initially normal chest X ray (19). Although computed
tomography is sensitive in identifying many abnormalities,
routine chest tomography in patients with potential
pulmonary disease is not practical.
When to Discontinue Isolation?
Discontinuing isolation of patients with known TB often
is less important for physicians but of paramount importance
to the hospital infection control staff, who need to know when
a patient no longer can transmit the tubercle bacillus.
Previous work, including studies comparing home versus
hospital therapy (20) and comparing outcome according to
smear or culture status at discharge (21), is >25 years old and
may no longer be pertinent to TB care in the 21st century.
Among time-honored approaches (22), the most common
is the practice of considering discharge after 2 weeks of
apparently effective therapy. Others wait until the sputum
AFB smear converts from positive to negative, which may
take 4 to 6 weeks. In areas where drug-resistant TB is
common, a more cautious approach might be waiting for at
least 2 weeks of smear-negativity or, if MDRTB is
documented, for culture negativity.
As important as clinical and smear status are the
conditions to which the patient will return. Because TB
disproportionately affects poor, homeless, and HIV-infected
persons, many TB patients should not return to their previous
living conditions until shown to be culture-negative. From
an infection control perspective, the question “Where is the
patient being discharged to?” is often more pertinent than
the question “When can the patient be discharged?”261 Vol. 7, No. 2, March–April 2001 Emerging Infectious Diseases
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Engineering Needs
Providing rooms with negative-pressure ventilation was
a formidable task for hospitals in the 1990s, and maintaining
these rooms is difficult. Warped door frames, shifts in outdoor
wind direction, and leaky window seals may interfere with
negative-pressure ventilation. Furthermore, no practical
consensus has been reached regarding the number of air
exchanges per hour needed to protect workers and other
patients.
Many experts advocate other engineering controls such
as UV light. Innovative studies are ongoing to define optimal
aerodynamics and ventilation and establish (or exclude) the
role of UV light in TB control. Certainly its inexpensiveness,
practicality, and exportability make it the most attractive
alternative, should it prove effective.
Personal Protective Equipment
A long public debate regarding optimal masks and
respirators was waged in the early 1990s, as cost and comfort
had to be weighed against patient and worker safety (23,24).
Eventually, a practical solution, the N-95 particulate
respirator, was agreed upon and is now used in U.S. hospitals.
Many infection control programs lost a degree of credibility
and good will in hospitals where clinicians resisted accepting
uncomfortable masks. Although compliance was achieved,
the consequences of forcing staff to follow an unpopular,
unproven regulation should not be minimized. The success of
other important infection control functions, such as annual
influenza vaccination drives and handwashing initiatives,
depends as much on good will as on scientific merit. The effort
expended to enforce a single intervention may have affected
the success of other programs to control nosocomial infections.
An additional problem relating to PPE is the requirement
for annual fit-testing of masks. Many health-care workers
have learned to expedite fit-testing by pretending not to taste
the saccharine used in fit-test checks. In addition, few
hospitals can deal effectively with the small subset of
employees who cannot be fit-tested successfully. Most
continue in their current jobs, using putatively inadequate
masks. Given the diminishing resources available to
hospitals, annual fit-testing could be replaced by an annual
self-assessment health questionnaire to identify workers who
need fit-testing.
The OSHA TB Standard
OSHA determined that the occupational risk for TB
warranted a standard to ensure worker protection and, in
1997, issued a working draft (10)—the second time that
OSHA has developed regulations to protect against an
infectious disease. The first such example was the Bloodborne
Pathogens Standard, which has significantly reduced
occupationally transmitted hepatitis B nationally. The date
for implementation of the TB standard is uncertain.
Many health-care workers in urban hospitals had
colleagues who became ill with acute TB infection during the
MDRTB outbreaks of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Some
have watched colleagues die of this nosocomial disease. Thus,
most workers welcome attempts to minimize nosocomial
spread of M. tuberculosis. Concern has arisen, however, that
the OSHA approach, estimated to cost $250 million annually,
is not scientifically sound and will not reduce risk beyond the
current regulations. The debate about scientific soundness
derives from the reliance on the PPD test, which is neither
sensitive nor specific, unlike the hepatitis B antibody and
surface antigen test on which the bloodborne pathogen
standard is based. Furthermore, the death rates used in the
cost assumptions appear far in excess of what most centers
have seen in the past decade. Finally, the regulations may
impose a financial burden on facilities such as homeless
shelters and drug treatment centers.
The ultimate goal of the standard, no occupational risk,
may not be achievable, even with unlimited resources and a
perfect test for latent disease. However, the intention of the
OSHA standard (minimizing occupational risk for contract-
ing TB) is worthy and will serve to draw public and employer
attention to the larger issue of occupational risk for infectious
disease. As additional data emerge, a more practical standard
that both protects workers and conserves valuable resources
may be developed.
Conclusions
A great deal about hospital TB control was relearned in
the 1990s, as hospitals nationwide struggled to contain
outbreaks.  We are now faced with the realization that we do
not know which of the many interventions were effective.
Furthermore, 21st century TB control efforts continue to rely
on the 19th-century PPD test and the insensitive sputum AFB
smear. It is hard to be optimistic about great gains in TB
control in the years ahead, beyond the current cautious, but
effective “isolate frequently” approach, as long as programs
continue to rely on these inadequate diagnostic tests. For at
least the next decade, the decidedly low-tech measures of
isolating persons with potential disease, wearing masks, and
keeping doors closed in rooms that house potential TB
patients will remain the cornerstones of TB control in U.S.
hospitals.
Dr. Sepkowitz is head of the clinical infectious disease section at
Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, where he leads infection
control. He has written extensively on occupational infections, par-
ticularly TB.
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